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_______________________________________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff Luis A. Fuentes appeals from the district 
court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, the New 
Jersey Casino Control Commission (the "Commission") and 
Commission Chairman Steven Perskie, in this national origin 
employment discrimination suit brought by Fuentes in the district 
court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981 & Supp. 1994).  The question before us 
is the proper standard for granting summary judgment in a claim 
arising under Title VII in the wake of the Supreme Court's 
decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 
(1993). In particular, we consider the evidence that a plaintiff, 
who has made out a prima facie case, must adduce to survive a 
motion for summary judgment when the defendant offers a 
legitimate reason for its employment action in a "pretext" 
employment discrimination case.  We hold that, to do so, the 
plaintiff generally must submit evidence which:  1) casts 
sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by 
the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that 
each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to 
infer that discrimination was more likely then not a motivating 
5 
or determinative cause of the adverse employment action. Because 
Fuentes failed to throw sufficient doubt on any of the 
Commission's proffered reasons, we will affirm the district 
court's grant of summary judgment. 
 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY0 
 The Commission, an agency of the State of New Jersey, 
see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1994), employed 
Fuentes on May 18, 1987 as Director of Affirmative Action and 
Planning.  At that time the Commission was comprised of five 
divisions.  Fuentes' position placed him in charge of the 
Division of Affirmative Action and Planning ("AA&P").  Fuentes 
reported directly to the Chairman of the Commission, Walter Read, 
from his initial hiring until Read's retirement in January 1990.  
Read was at all times satisfied with Fuentes' performance.  
Fuentes also developed a close working relationship with 
Commissioner David Waters, who had a special interest in 
affirmative action.  Waters was fond of Fuentes, and credited him 
with the turnaround of the Division.   
                     
0In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we (i) 
resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the nonmovant, (ii) do 
not engage in credibility determinations, and (iii) draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant.  The movant has 
the burden of pointing out that evidence cognizable in a motion 
for summary judgment which the movant believes entitles it to 
summary judgment; the nonmovant must then respond by pointing to 
sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact 
concerning every element as to which the nonmoving party will 
bear the burden of proof at trial. See Davis v. Portline 
Transportes Maritime Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 536 & n.3 (3d 
Cir. 1994). 
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 On August 20, 1990, newly elected Governor James Florio 
appointed defendant Perskie as Chairman of the Commission.  In 
the ensuing two months, Perskie undertook an informal review of 
the entire Commission, including its structure.  Faced with a 
declining budget and state-issued directives to reduce staffing, 
Perskie requested his Executive Assistant Joseph Papp to develop 
a reorganization plan (the "Plan").  The resulting Plan 
incorporated most of the recommendations made by a private 
consulting firm hired by the Commission to audit its utilization 
of resources.  On November 7, 1990, Perskie announced an 
ambitious Plan to the Commission staff, and the Commission 
adopted it two weeks later. 
 The Plan called for the elimination of two divisions, 
including AA&P,0 the creation of a new Compliance Division, and 
the considerable reorganization of two others.  The Plan trans-
ferred the primary functions of AA&P to a subdivision, entitled 
the Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity Unit 
("AA/EEO"), within the new Compliance Division.  The 
reorganization reduced the Commission's staff from 542 to 446 
employees. 
 The Commission resolved to post and advertise all new 
management positions.  Fuentes, along with all other personnel 
whose positions would be eliminated under the Plan, was advised 
to apply for the new positions that interested him, and he, along 
with twenty-five other candidates, applied for the position of 
                     
0Fuentes does not contend that illegal discrimination caused the 
elimination of his old position as Director of AA&P. 
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Chief of AA/EEO.  Fuentes and four others were eventually 
interviewed for that position.  The Committee, meeting in an 
executive session, agreed that several of the other interviewees 
were better qualified than Fuentes for that position.  Acting on 
the Committee's behalf, Perskie met with Fuentes to inform him 
that he would probably not be hired to fill it.0 Approximately 
one month later, on January 2, 1991, the Committee reached its 
decision to hire Gustave Thomas for that position by a vote of 
four to one.0  Fuentes, who is Latino (Puerto Rican), brought the 
proceedings which led to this action.0 
 The district court concluded that Fuentes had made out 
a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the 
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks line of cases, see McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973); 
Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. 
Ct. 1089 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 
(1993), a conclusion which the defendants have never challenged.  
The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff had not adduced 
sufficient evidence to enable a rational jury to conclude that 
defendants' numerous proffered reasons for failing to hire 
Fuentes were pretextual and that the real reason was discrimina-
tory, and hence it granted summary judgment for the Commission.  
                     
0Two other directors, who were similarly approached, tendered 
their resignations.  Neither was a member of plaintiff's 
protected class. 
0The Commission voted on all the proposed personnel actions as a 
package. 
0Fuentes is also an African-American, but he does not claim 
racial discrimination, perhaps because Thomas -- the person who 
was hired for the job he sought -- is also an African-American. 
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It is from this judgment that Fuentes appeals.  We exercise 
plenary review. 
 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 In a case of failure to hire or promote under Title 
VII, the plaintiff first 
must carry the initial burden under the statute of 
establishing a prima facie case of [unlawful] 
discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he 
belongs to a [protected category]; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 
his rejection, the position remained open and the 
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 
complainant's qualifications. 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824.  If the 
plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason for the employee's rejection."  Id. 
 The employer satisfies its burden of production by 
introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the 
conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the 
unfavorable employment decision.  See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748.  
The employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually 
motivated its behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting 
paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimina-
tion always rests with the plaintiff.  See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
253, 254, 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1094, 1095.  Once the employer 
answers its relatively light burden by articulating a legitimate 
reason for the unfavorable employment decision, the burden of 
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production rebounds to the plaintiff, who must now show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the employer's explanation is 
pretextual (thus meeting the plaintiff's burden of persuasion). 
 At trial, the plaintiff must convince the factfinder 
"both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the 
real reason."  Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752; see id. at 2754 ("It is 
not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must 
believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional 
discrimination." (emphasis in original)).  The factfinder's 
rejection of the employer's proffered, legitimate reason permits, 
but does not compel, a verdict for the plaintiff.  See Hicks, 113 
S. Ct. at 2749.  The test is whether the plaintiff ultimately 
persuades the factfinder that the employment decision was caused 
by bias, and for that purpose both the plaintiff's prima facie 
case and the factfinder's rejection of the employer's proffered 
evidence are circumstantial evidence of unlawful discrimination.  
See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 
   To prevail at trial, the plaintiff must prove not 
that the illegitimate factor was the sole reason for the 
decision, but that the illegitimate factor was a determinative 
factor in the adverse employment decision, that is, that but for 
the protected characteristic, the plaintiff would have been hired 
(or promoted).  See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 
(1993) (holding under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA") that "a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless 
the employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the 
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decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the 
outcome").0 
 This basic framework under Title VII illustrates that, 
to defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers the 
plaintiff's prima facie case with legitimate, non-discriminatory 
reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to some 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 
reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated 
legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discrimi-
natory reason was more likely than not a motivating or 
determinative cause of the employer's action.  See, e.g., Hicks, 
113 S. Ct. at 2479; Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 
983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 
256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993).   
 Because the factfinder may infer from the combination 
of the plaintiff's prima facie case and its own rejection of the 
employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the employer 
unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff and was merely 
trying to conceal its illegal act with the articulated reasons, 
see Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749, a plaintiff who has made out a 
prima facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by 
either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circum-
stantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether 
                     
0Hazen is an ADEA case but, where appropriate, the analysis used 
in describing the evidentiary burdens in an ADEA case are also 
used in a Title VII case.  See e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh 
Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 1087 (1984). 
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circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely 
than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse 
employment action.  Thus, if the plaintiff has pointed to some 
evidence discrediting the defendant's proffered reasons, to 
survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also come forward 
with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her 
prima facie case.  See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 
F.3d 1120, 1122-24 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 We have stated that a plaintiff may avoid summary 
judgment by pointing to "some" evidence from which a factfinder 
could reasonably conclude that the defendant's proffered reasons 
were fabricated (pretext).  Next, we consider what quantum of 
evidence is required. We can reject out of hand the two extreme 
positions:  that the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment simply 
by arguing that the jury need not believe the defendant's 
proffered legitimate explanations on the one hand, or that the 
plaintiff must adduce evidence directly contradicting the 
defendant's proffered legitimate explanations on the other.  The 
correct solution lies somewhere in between:  to avoid summary 
judgment, the plaintiff's evidence rebutting the employer's 
proffered legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder to 
reasonably infer that each of the employer's proffered non-
discriminatory reasons, see Logue v. International Rehab. 
Assocs., Inc., 837 F.2d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that 
"the district court erred in failing to consider all of [the 
employer's] proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for 
[the plaintiff's] termination" (emphasis supplied)), aff'd after 
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remand, 866 F.2d 1411 (3d Cir. 1989), was either a post hoc 
fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment 
action (that is, the proffered reason is a pretext). See 
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124; Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 
F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993).0 
 To discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, 
the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was 
wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether 
discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the 
employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.  See Ezold, 983 
F.2d at 531, 533; Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 
131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 181 (1991).  Rather, the 
non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for 
its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 
them "unworthy of credence," Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531, and hence 
infer "that the employer did not act for [the asserted] non-
discriminatory reasons."0  Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 
                     
0We do not hold that, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff 
must cast doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum.  If the 
defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the 
plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of 
them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder.  
That is because the factfinder's rejection of some of the defen-
dant's proffered reasons may impede the employer's credibility 
seriously enough so that a factfinder may rationally disbelieve 
the remaining proffered reasons, even if no evidence undermining 
those remaining rationales in particular is available.   
0Of course, a decision foolish, imprudent, or incompetent by 
comparison to the employer's usual mode of operation can render 
it implausible, inconsistent, contradictory, or weak. 
13 
996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted); 
see id. at 638 (holding that the proper inquiry is whether the 
plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence of "inconsistencies 
and implausibilities in the employer's proffered reasons"); 
Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527 ("[A] plaintiff has the burden of casting 
doubt on an employer's articulated reasons for an employment 
decision." (internal quotations omitted)).  While this standard 
places a difficult burden on the plaintiff, "[i]t arises from an 
inherent tension between the goal of all discrimination law and 
our society's commitment to free decisionmaking by the private 
sector in economic affairs."  Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531. 
 
III.  APPLICATION TO THIS CASE  
 As just developed, to survive summary judgment, Fuentes 
had either (i) to present sufficient evidence to meaningfully 
throw into question, i.e., to cast substantial doubt upon, the 
Commission's proffered reasons for not hiring him (e.g., by 
painting them as weak, implausible, contradictory, or incoher-
ent), or (ii) to come forward with sufficient evidence from which 
a factfinder could reasonably conclude that an illegitimate 
factor more likely than not was a motivating or determinative 
cause of the adverse employment decision (e.g., by showing that 
the employer in the past had subjected him to unlawful 
discriminatory treatment, that the employer treated other, 
similarly situated persons not of his protected class more 
favorably, or that the employer has discriminated against other 
members of his protected class or other protected categories of 
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persons).  Fuentes has failed to raise a material issue of fact 
on either ground. 
 The Commission has advanced a multitude of reasons for 
not hiring Fuentes.  Notably, none of the reasons was that 
Fuentes was unqualified for the job; in the end, the Commission 
elected to hire Thomas instead of Fuentes because it felt that 
Thomas was better qualified.  In considering Fuentes for the 
newly created position of Chief of AA/EEO, the Commission faulted 
Fuentes for (i) lacking leadership qualities (Fuentes, in 
response to a request by Perskie for proposals for reorganization 
by each division head, had issued a brief and insubstantial 
recommendation; he failed to arrange to meet with Perskie about 
that memorandum although it was clear Perskie wished to discuss 
it;0 in a report he included issues critical of a casino which he 
had not first discussed with the casino; and he failed to seek a 
meeting with Perskie after the press on two separate occasions 
reported that Perskie publicly criticized Fuentes' Division of 
AA&P); (ii) lacking management ability (Fuentes habitually 
arrived to work late, departed early, and took extended lunches; 
morale in AA&P was declining and the staff was unproductive; and 
despite repeated requests Fuentes declined to participate in 
committees including casino representatives to discuss major 
issues facing the casino industry, including labor and minority 
                     
0Although the parties dispute whether Perskie explicitly 
instructed the Directors to arrange a meeting with him or whether 
Perskie was to arrange the meetings, Fuentes' failure to contact 
Perskie for ten weeks is pertinent to his initiative and leader-
ship (we note that every Director besides Fuentes arranged such a 
meeting). 
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business set-asides); (iii) lacking developed interpersonal 
skills (Fuentes had a poor working relationship with some of the 
Commissioners; and he lacked a good rapport with casino industry 
affirmative action officers because they felt he considered 
himself too important to meet with them); and (iv) unprofessional 
conduct (Fuentes was observed inside a car in a casino parking 
lot engaging in sexual activities; he got into a brawl at a 
casino, then misrepresented himself to be a police officer and 
used his influence as a Commission employee to receive special 
treatment; and on one occasion he shared confidential casino 
information with the public).  The defendants contrast those 
incidents with Thomas' superior qualifications, corroborated by 
his remarkable accomplishments since being hired.  Without going 
into each justification in detail, we simply note that Fuentes 
has not succeeded in throwing enough doubt on any of those 
explanations so that a rational factfinder could reject it.  
 Fuentes does make a timing argument, predicated on 
Josey, see id., 996 F.2d at 638-39 (illustrating that, "[o]n 
different occasions, this court has found that factors such as 
the defendant's credibility, the timing of an employee's 
dismissal, and the employer's treatment of the employee could 
raise an inference of pretext which would make summary judgment 
for the employer inappropriate"), namely, that things were going 
well for him until Perskie was appointed to head the Commission.  
But that is not the type of timing evidence Josey was referring 
to, namely, the timing of events which can give rise to an 
inference of improper motivation.  The fact that a newly 
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appointed chairman, in a time of shrinking budgets state-wide and 
a governor's directive to eliminate staff positions, reorganizes 
a state agency and hires new managers for positions newly created 
by the reorganization who he believes will best perform the tasks 
at hand does not throw real doubt on the employer's proffered 
legitimate reason. 
 Additionally, Fuentes complains of the fact that the 
Commission documented its reasons for not hiring Fuentes after it 
had decided not to hire him (he refers to this as a calculated 
accumulation of all the negative facts and inferences from his 
past experience at the Commission) and argues that this post-
decision undertaking leads to a strong inference of coverup 
(i.e., fabrication).  As the district court pointed out, however, 
the Commissioners were not unrealistic to anticipate that 
Fuentes, no stranger to employment discrimination laws, would sue 
the Commission, and in this case the Commission's documentation 
can only be described as displaying business acumen.  Given the 
frequency of employment discrimination suits, an employer which 
documents its reasons for taking adverse employment actions can 
often be more suitably described as sensible than as devious.  
Absent evidence providing an independent reason to suspect the 
act, the documentation of the reasons for rejecting an applicant 
is insufficient, in and of itself, to give rise to a reasonable 
inference of discriminatory motive. 
 Fuentes also attacks Papp's statement that he received 
complaints from five to ten members of the Division of Licensing 
critical of Fuentes because Papp did not remember their names 
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almost three years after the events in question transpired.  
Additionally, he discounts two of the four complaints Papp 
received from members of Fuentes' staff (Papp was able to name 
all four staff members raising the complaints) because two of 
those members were allegedly biased against him and hence not 
credible (we note that Fuentes has not contended that those staff 
members were biased against him because of his national origin).  
These criticisms amount to little more than the schoolground 
retort, "Not so," an approach which, as discussed supra at 11, 
does not create a material issue of fact.  In the context at 
hand, the issue is not whether the staff members' criticisms of 
Fuentes were substantiated or valid, or whether Papp was remiss 
to rely upon feedback received from members of Fuentes' staff who 
might be (non-discriminatorily) biased against him.  Instead, 
since Papp, not the staff members, was the relevant decisionma-
ker, the question is whether Papp believed those criticisms to be 
accurate and actually relied upon them, since only if Fuentes can 
prove that Papp in fact did not rely upon them can Fuentes show 
"pretext."  We conclude that a factfinder could not reasonably 
find that Fuentes' cross-examination impeached Papp's statements 
to the point of rendering them weak, implausible, or incredible. 
 Instead of throwing doubt on defendants' explanations, 
Fuentes principally tries to go the alternate route by pointing 
to evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude 
that discrimination was the more likely cause of his discharge.  
First, plaintiff argues that Chairman Read, his direct 
supervisor, thought that he was doing a fine job.  Commissioner 
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Waters, who took a special interest in affirmative action, also 
approved of Fuentes' job performance.0  But, as we stated in 
Ezold, the fact that the relevant decisionmakers disagree about 
the plaintiff's qualifications does not evidence discrimination.  
See id., 983 F.2d at 533.  To avoid summary judgment, the 
plaintiff must point to some evidence from which a factfinder 
could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff satisfied the 
criterion that the decisionmakers disapproving of him relied upon 
(e.g., by showing that others no more qualified than he under 
that criterion were not treated adversely), or that the 
decisionmakers did not actually rely upon that criterion.  As 
noted in the preceding paragraph, Fuentes' proffered evidence 
does not reasonably permit either conclusion. 
 Second, Fuentes argues that during his interview for 
the Chief of AA/EEO position, he was not questioned but was 
"interrogated" about Perskie's dissatisfaction with his job 
performance.  As the district court noted, however, the facts 
that Fuentes had been working at the Commission for over three 
years, and that he was known to the interviewers (if not 
personally, then at least by reputation, opinion, and report), 
justified a departure from the normal interviewing process, and 
hence the "interrogation" does not raise an inference of 
invidious discrimination.  It would defy common sense for an 
interviewer to put aside all his or her personal and/or acquired 
                     
0While he also cites his positive yearly Commission evaluations, 
Fuentes admits that he himself filled them out without any super-
vision or review. 
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knowledge of the interviewee and to proceed as if the interviewee 
were a stranger, and Title VII does not mandate so much.  In any 
event, at his deposition Fuentes described the nature of the 
"interrogatories" directed at him as "[g]eneral questions about 
the industry," hardly an improper or suspicious subject given the 
position for which he was applying. 
 Third, Fuentes complains that, having corrected Commis-
sioner Dodd's mispronunciation of his name some 20 months prior 
to the Commission's failure to hire Fuentes as Chief of AA/EEO 
(Fuentes testified that Dodd had asked to call Fuentes the 
English "Louis" instead of the Latino "Luis" because Dodd 
asserted he had "difficulty" pronouncing "Luis" and felt "more 
comfortable" with "Louis", and that he had responded that he 
would prefer Dodd call him by his Latino name), Dodd thereafter 
referred to him as "Director" instead of by his first name.0  
This evidence shows only that Dodd disliked Fuentes' first name 
because he had difficulty pronouncing it (not because it was a 
Latino name), and may reflect on Dodd's insensitivity and 
unprofessionalism.  But we do not think that a jury could 
reasonably construe these incidents, standing alone (as they do), 
as evidencing Dodd's bias against Puerto Ricans or Latinos, or to 
mean that Dodd invidiously discriminated against Fuentes because 
of his national origin.  Cf. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 ("Stray 
remarks by non-decisionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to 
                     
0The defendants concede that Dodd referred to other Directors by 
their first names.  The record does not give any indication how 
often Dodd and Fuentes had contact or, in particular, how often 
Dodd referred to Fuentes as "Director." 
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the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly 
if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision."). 
 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order 
granting summary judgment to the defendants will be affirmed. 
